{"id":1842000,"date":"2025-06-08T17:00:46","date_gmt":"2025-06-08T17:00:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/1842000\/"},"modified":"2025-06-08T17:00:46","modified_gmt":"2025-06-08T17:00:46","slug":"still-think-russia-is-winning-watch-this-before-you-speak-again","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/1842000\/","title":{"rendered":"Still Think Russia is Winning? WATCH THIS Before You Speak Again"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\"  width=\"580\" height=\"385\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/gpyLQvNsUw4\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><br \/>\n<br \/>\nStill Think Russia is Winning? WATCH THIS Before You Speak Again<br \/>\n<br \/>\nOn February 24, 2022, Russia invaded\u00a0<br \/>\nUkraine\u2014confident, cocky, and certain of a three-day victory. \u201cKyiv will fall within\u00a0<br \/>\n72 hours,\u201d they said. Russia\u2019s military was the world\u2019s second most powerful, or so we were told.\u00a0<br \/>\nThe war? Just a formality. Three years later, Russia holds just 20% of Ukraine. And it\u2019s paid\u00a0<br \/>\nfor it with nearly one million casualties. One million dead and wounded. More than the\u00a0<br \/>\nU.S. suffered in two decades of the War on Terror\u2014compressed into just three years. And\u00a0<br \/>\nthat\u2019s only the beginning of the disaster. Today on The Military Show, we\u2019re dismantling the\u00a0<br \/>\nillusion that Russia is \u201cwinning\u201d this war. We\u2019ll break down the territory myths, the manpower\u00a0<br \/>\ncrisis, the shattered economy, the propaganda, and the growing whispers that the Russian Federation\u00a0<br \/>\nitself may not survive the consequences of Putin\u2019s blunder. So if you still believe the narrative\u00a0<br \/>\nthat Russia\u2019s got the upper hand\u2014you\u2019ll want to watch this to the end. Let\u2019s start with the cold,\u00a0<br \/>\nbrutal numbers&#8230; The Institute for the Study of War\u2019s assessment from February 2022 states that\u00a0<br \/>\n\u201cRussia captured approximately 4,200 sq km of Ukrainian territory last year, most of which was\u00a0<br \/>\nin the Donetsk area.\u201d This area is only slightly larger than Rhode Island, the smallest U.S. state\u00a0<br \/>\nby area. Comparatively, 4,200 square kilometers is around 0.6% of Ukraine\u2019s total territory size.\u00a0<br \/>\nAnd that\u2019s where it gets truly mind-boggling. Forbes did some independent number crunching\u00a0<br \/>\nusing statistics from April 2025, where Russia only took around 68 square miles of territory.\u00a0<br \/>\nIf Ukraine maintains that level of defenses and Russia doesn\u2019t step up on the offensive, the War\u00a0<br \/>\nin Ukraine would take another 230 years. That\u2019s how long Russia would need to occupy the entire\u00a0<br \/>\ncountry, one of the surefire ways to win. The same analysis suggested that Russia would need around\u00a0<br \/>\n100 million casualties to achieve this, against its total 2025 population of around 144 million.\u00a0<br \/>\nThis is far from a strategy. It\u2019s a complete absence of one, requiring a multi-generational\u00a0<br \/>\ninvestment in war, which brings about other severe issues. But territory only tells part\u00a0<br \/>\nof the story. Let\u2019s talk about the human cost of Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s imperial\u00a0<br \/>\ndelusions. According to the latest data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, Russian forces\u00a0<br \/>\nhave suffered approximately 975,000 casualties since February 2022. While we should approach\u00a0<br \/>\nany wartime statistics from Ukraine with caution, even conservative Western estimates from the U.K.\u00a0<br \/>\nMinistry of Defense put Russian casualties well above 750,000 at the end of last year. To put\u00a0<br \/>\nthis in perspective, Russia lost approximately 15,000 soldiers during its 10-year war in\u00a0<br \/>\nAfghanistan. In just three years in Ukraine, they\u2019ve suffered casualties over 60 times higher.\u00a0<br \/>\nTo put it bluntly, this is not a sustainable war effort. Russia\u2019s demographic crisis was already\u00a0<br \/>\nsevere before the war, with a declining and aging population. The country\u2019s fertility rate was\u00a0<br \/>\ncrippled by the economic crisis at the fall of the Soviet Union, reaching as low as 1.2 births\u00a0<br \/>\nper woman by the turn of the century. While the situation got slightly better, the country is\u00a0<br \/>\nstill far below the replacement rate. As a result, there\u2019s a significant lack of working-age males\u00a0<br \/>\nyounger than 30 simply because they were never born in the first place, and Russia is also\u00a0<br \/>\nconscripting from that same lacking demographic. Now, factor in not just the direct military losses\u00a0<br \/>\nbut also the estimated 920,000 Russians who have fled the country to avoid conscription. That\u2019s\u00a0<br \/>\nnearly 2 million working-age men removed from Russia\u2019s economy and society in just three years\u00a0<br \/>\nbeyond demographic shortages. In short, Russia is literally running out of people to throw into this\u00a0<br \/>\nmeat grinder. But to understand the extent of the tragedy that is likely going to befall Russia,\u00a0<br \/>\nlet\u2019s roll back to the start of the invasion. Russian military planners were so confident\u00a0<br \/>\nthey\u2019d be celebrating in Kyiv within days that they packed parade uniforms. Combat plans shared\u00a0<br \/>\nwith troops indicated they should prepare for light resistance followed by occupation duties. In\u00a0<br \/>\nfact, Russia\u2019s military logistics were structured around the assumption that Ukraine would\u00a0<br \/>\ncollapse almost immediately. Three years later, those assumptions look not just wrong but\u00a0<br \/>\ndelusional. Instead of a swift victory parade, Russia got bogged down in the longest conventional\u00a0<br \/>\nwar in Europe since World War II. Their vaunted air force failed to establish air superiority.\u00a0<br \/>\nTheir tank forces were decimated by portable anti-tank weapons and drones. Their elite units\u00a0<br \/>\nsuffered catastrophic losses in the early phases, forcing Russia to resort to poorly trained\u00a0<br \/>\nconscripts, convicts, and foreign mercenaries. The Center for Strategic and International Studies\u00a0<br \/>\n(CSIS) published a damning report in September 2024 titled \u201cThe Russia-Ukraine War: A Study\u00a0<br \/>\nin Analytic Failure.\u201d The conclusion was that Russia\u2019s military planning represented perhaps the\u00a0<br \/>\nmost significant intelligence failure of the 21st century. This sentiment was shared by the French\u00a0<br \/>\nInstitute of International Relations (IFRI), which posited that Russia forewent its traditional\u00a0<br \/>\nlogistical channels due to the erroneous belief that the war wouldn\u2019t last more than a few\u00a0<br \/>\nweeks. In short, Putin maintained the illusion that Russia was a great military force, but the\u00a0<br \/>\nmilitary didn\u2019t have the planning or logistics to back that illusion up. Due to the secrecy behind\u00a0<br \/>\nthe plans involved in the invasion, many higher officers were caught unaware of the true extent\u00a0<br \/>\nof the invasion and failed to properly stock up on supplies before the war began in earnest. This\u00a0<br \/>\nled to severe supply shortages in the crucial first few months of the war when Russia maintained\u00a0<br \/>\nthe initiative. After the initial rebuttal at the Hostomel Airport, which was essentially Russia\u2019s\u00a0<br \/>\nHail Mary to conquer Ukraine with minimal losses, Russia failed to properly follow up, with\u00a0<br \/>\na significant lack of adaptability that has become a necessity in modern warfare. Soon enough,\u00a0<br \/>\nUkraine took back most of the territory it lost to the initial invasion, and the conflict devolved\u00a0<br \/>\ninto one of attrition. Russian propaganda channels still peddled the idea that the war is a foregone\u00a0<br \/>\nconclusion, celebrating minor tactical gains of a few square miles. But in truth, Russia is losing\u00a0<br \/>\na war to itself by running out of money to fund the war effort. On paper, Russia retains the 11th\u00a0<br \/>\nspot on the list of the world\u2019s largest economies. But strip back the veneer, and the situation\u00a0<br \/>\nis problematic at best. Western sanctions have decimated Russia\u2019s high-tech sectors, crippled\u00a0<br \/>\nits banking system, and isolated it from global markets. By the end of 2024, the ruble had lost\u00a0<br \/>\n23 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar, with the exchange rate between the two currencies\u00a0<br \/>\nfluctuating daily to create incomprehensible uncertainty of the country\u2019s real economic status.\u00a0<br \/>\nBut the most devastating economic impact comes from Russia\u2019s pivot to a war economy. According\u00a0<br \/>\nto an analysis by Meduza, Russia now spends an estimated 40 percent of its governmental\u00a0<br \/>\nbudget on defense\u2014a level unsustainable for any modern economy. Worse yet, a third of it\u00a0<br \/>\nis hidden under \u201csecret projects\u201d related to the military-industrial complex, indicating an\u00a0<br \/>\nunprecedented level of propaganda and paranoia surrounding the Kremlin. What makes this situation\u00a0<br \/>\neven more dire is that Russia\u2019s primary source of income\u2014energy exports\u2014faces long-term decline.\u00a0<br \/>\nThe European Union has reduced its dependence on Russian gas by over 30% since 2022, and oil sales\u00a0<br \/>\nto China and India are being negotiated at steep discounts. The dependence on oil and gas, which\u00a0<br \/>\nconstitutes between 30 and 50% of the government\u2019s revenue, means that the country\u2019s already-lacking\u00a0<br \/>\nworkforce is increasingly turning to the one single profitable industry (the energy sector).\u00a0<br \/>\nThis makes Russian manufacturing increasingly rely on imports, especially from China, as well\u00a0<br \/>\nas the entire country needing to import the workforce to meet its increasing demands. With\u00a0<br \/>\nRussia losing both militarily and economically, it has a few options beyond simply continuing\u00a0<br \/>\nas-is and accepting that war is the new status quo. None of them is good. Option one (but not\u00a0<br \/>\nlikely to happen) is a massive escalation. Some hardliners in the Kremlin have pushed for using\u00a0<br \/>\npretty much everything Russia has to win the war, going so far as to propose the use of tactical\u00a0<br \/>\nnuclear weapons. This wouldn\u2019t be the first mention of nuclear warfare, as Putin himself\u00a0<br \/>\nhas saber-rattled on the topic more than two dozen times. But this scenario would ultimately\u00a0<br \/>\nbackfire. While a limited nuclear deployment (such as destroying Kyiv or vital military sites)\u00a0<br \/>\nmight create short-term tactical advantages, NATO would be basically hard-pressed to answer\u00a0<br \/>\nwith nuclear weapons of their own. In response, Russia would need to use its supplies of weapons\u00a0<br \/>\non NATO countries, plunging most of the world into a nuclear winter. And even that escalation\u00a0<br \/>\nwouldn\u2019t solve Russia\u2019s core problems. Russia desperately needs both the land and the people\u00a0<br \/>\nin Ukraine. Bombing them to oblivion makes the region uninhabitable, and the country would lose\u00a0<br \/>\nthe potential 40 million citizens, which would be used to prop up the failing demographics and\u00a0<br \/>\nworkforce instead of resorting to immigration. The second option is withdrawing from Ukraine. Russia\u00a0<br \/>\nwould likely only use this as a last resort, as it represents a devastating political defeat for\u00a0<br \/>\nPutin\u2019s regime, which has staked its legitimacy on this war. A withdrawal from Ukraine without\u00a0<br \/>\nachieving core war aims would likely trigger elite fragmentation within Russia and potentially\u00a0<br \/>\nregime collapse. Putin\u2019s government is a carefully built house of cards, hinging on the fact that\u00a0<br \/>\nPutin has been able to get what he wants for the past two decades. Annexing Crimea and fueling\u00a0<br \/>\ndiscourse within NATO have been key geopolitical wins for the Russian president. If the situation\u00a0<br \/>\nturns around, it will send a clear signal that the country\u2019s top echelon of government is\u00a0<br \/>\nactually not nearly as powerful as it seems. This explains why, despite catastrophic losses, Russia\u00a0<br \/>\ncontinues to pour resources into this conflict. The alternative\u2014admitting defeat\u2014is viewed as an\u00a0<br \/>\nexistential threat to the current power structure. The third option is a peace deal, even in a\u00a0<br \/>\nlimited form. While this might seem most rational after three years of basically trench warfare\u00a0<br \/>\nwith drones, no side can reach an agreement on it. First, Ukraine has little incentive to negotiate\u00a0<br \/>\naway territory after successfully defending its sovereignty for three years. President\u00a0<br \/>\nVolodymyr Zelenskyy\u2019s peace proposal demands full territorial restoration, possibly including\u00a0<br \/>\nCrimea, as well as security guarantees from NATO. Even if Ukraine cedes territory, Zelenskyy has\u00a0<br \/>\nput NATO reassurance as one of his top priorities, even if he needs to step down as president in\u00a0<br \/>\nthe process. Russia, meanwhile, cannot accept any agreement that doesn\u2019t legitimize its territorial\u00a0<br \/>\nconquests. And international geopolitics and relations are further complicating the matters.\u00a0<br \/>\nPresident Donald Trump\u2019s administration\u2019s erratic approach to Ukraine has undermined consistent\u00a0<br \/>\ndiplomacy. In February 2025, Trump met with Zelenskyy directly to propose a peace plan\u00a0<br \/>\nthat would have ceded significant Ukrainian territory to Russia, contradicting the stated\u00a0<br \/>\nposition of his own State Department. It caused a near complete breakdown in relations between\u00a0<br \/>\nthe two countries, ultimately resulting in Ukraine requesting revisions of mineral deals\u00a0<br \/>\nand the U.S. backing out of peace discussions between the warring parties. Even worse, Russia\u00a0<br \/>\nhas publicly stated, multiple times at that, that it wants to find a peaceful solution, going\u00a0<br \/>\nso far as to accept probationary ceasefires. None of them worked, with the 30-hour Easter\u00a0<br \/>\nceasefire resulting in Ukraine claiming Russia broke it nearly 3,000 times. So Russia is caught\u00a0<br \/>\nin a strategic trap of its own making\u2014unable to win militarily, unwilling to accept defeat, and\u00a0<br \/>\nincapable of pursuing a diplomatic solution. Let\u2019s zoom out and look at the bigger picture. What has\u00a0<br \/>\nRussia actually achieved through this catastrophic military adventure? Before the invasion, NATO\u00a0<br \/>\nwas an alliance searching for purpose, with many questioning its relevance in the post-Cold\u00a0<br \/>\nWar world. Trump himself criticized the alliance, as most members failed to meet the basic\u00a0<br \/>\nrequirement of using 2% of their GDP on military. Today, it\u2019s revitalized and expanded,\u00a0<br \/>\nwith Finland and Sweden as new members. The 800-mile border between Finland and Russia\u00a0<br \/>\npractically doubled the NATO-Russia border, significantly curbing Russia\u2019s ability to actually\u00a0<br \/>\ndefend itself in a theoretical conflict against the economically larger, demographically stronger,\u00a0<br \/>\nand militarily more modern alliance. Specifically, the biggest changes came to countries that can\u00a0<br \/>\nhold large sway in the alliance. Germany, one of the world\u2019s largest economies, instituted new\u00a0<br \/>\nfunding incentives for national defense. Poland, which was once a member of the Warsaw Pact,\u00a0<br \/>\nplans to create the largest standing army in Europe. Sweden and Finland have pushed their\u00a0<br \/>\nmilitary industrial complexes to the limit, sending prototypes of vital equipment to Ukraine\u00a0<br \/>\nand partnering with the U.S. and U.K. contractors to deliver deadlier weapons. Diplomatically,\u00a0<br \/>\nRussia has transformed from a respected if difficult global power into a pariah state with\u00a0<br \/>\nlimited international options. Russia\u2019s largest trading partner switched from the EU to China, a\u00a0<br \/>\ncountry that is even more dependent on resources and can significantly undermine Russian policies\u00a0<br \/>\nto get access to them. All of these issues came from a single problem that Russia failed to\u00a0<br \/>\naccount for: the glaring gap between its projected military power and actual combat performance.\u00a0<br \/>\nBefore February 2022, Russia\u2019s military was widely considered the world\u2019s second most formidable\u00a0<br \/>\nfighting force. Military analysts routinely cited its 1,320,000 active-duty personnel,\u00a0<br \/>\n2 million reservists, 6,000 tanks, and 4,000 aircraft as evidence of overwhelming strength.\u00a0<br \/>\nAnnual military parades showcased supposedly cutting-edge equipment like the T-14 Armata tank,\u00a0<br \/>\nSu-57 stealth fighter, and hypersonic missiles. The Global Firepower Index consistently ranked\u00a0<br \/>\nRussia second, only to the United States. Western military planners built entire defense strategies\u00a0<br \/>\naround countering this perceived threat. And when the second-largest military invaded a smaller\u00a0<br \/>\nneighbor, it turned out none of the statistics really mattered. Instead of the feared Russian\u00a0<br \/>\ncolossus, we saw: Elite paratroopers dropped into Hostomel Airport without proper support, resulting\u00a0<br \/>\nin a complete failure to establish the air tunnel necessary to win the invasion 40-mile-long armored\u00a0<br \/>\ncolumns running out of fuel just miles from their own borders Tanks deployed without infantry\u00a0<br \/>\nsupport, making them easy prey for Ukrainian anti-tank teams Russia resorting to sending\u00a0<br \/>\nhuman wave attacks, a tactic considered fit for World War I Logistics trucks with commercial\u00a0<br \/>\ntires that failed in off-road conditions Aircraft unable to effectively suppress Ukrainian\u00a0<br \/>\nair defenses Museum pieces like the T-62, T-55, and possibly even the T-34 (from all the way\u00a0<br \/>\nback DURING World War 2), making their way to the frontline Perhaps most damning was the so-called\u00a0<br \/>\nmodern equipment itself. Those supposedly advanced T-90M tanks? Many were found with what should\u2019ve\u00a0<br \/>\nbeen \u201creactive armor blocks\u201d filled with sand and cement instead of explosives. The feared\u00a0<br \/>\nattack helicopters and fighter jets? Plagued by navigation systems so unreliable that pilots\u00a0<br \/>\ntaped commercial GPS units to their dashboards. And what about those next-generation weapons that\u00a0<br \/>\ncaused so much concern in Western defense circles? The T-14 Armata tanks made a brief appearance in\u00a0<br \/>\n2023 before being withdrawn. They either failed miserably or were too expensive to get blown up\u00a0<br \/>\nby cheap drones. The Su-57 stealth fighters have conducted only limited strike missions from safe\u00a0<br \/>\ndistances within Russian airspace, lobbing glide bombs (the one saving grace of Russian military\u00a0<br \/>\ntactics, which also harken back to its Cold War weapon stores). But how could Russia\u2019s military\u00a0<br \/>\nleadership so catastrophically misjudge both their own capabilities and Ukrainian resistance?\u00a0<br \/>\nThe answer reveals something fundamental about Putin\u2019s Russia. Russian intelligence services\u00a0<br \/>\nbelieved that Ukrainian forces would immediately collapse and that most Ukrainians would welcome\u00a0<br \/>\nRussian troops as liberators. This wasn\u2019t just a military miscalculation\u2014it was a fundamental\u00a0<br \/>\nfailure to understand reality, driven by the very propaganda machine Putin had created to maintain\u00a0<br \/>\nhis grip on power. One of the fatal flaws of the authoritarian regime that Putin created in Russia\u00a0<br \/>\nis that it completely depends on Putin\u2019s image as a leader. Brookings maintained that this is only\u00a0<br \/>\ntenable so long as the autocrat stays in power, which can severely damage the longevity of the\u00a0<br \/>\ncountry as a whole. Former Kremlin advisor Gleb Pavlovsky, now in exile, explained it more bluntly\u00a0<br \/>\nin his April 2022 interview: \u201cThis is all Putin\u2019s own personal decision&#8230; Nobody, including myself,\u00a0<br \/>\nrealized just how maniacally obsessed he must have been with Ukraine. We underestimated the extent\u00a0<br \/>\nof decay of the Russian government.\u201d Remember, this interview was only a month and a half into\u00a0<br \/>\nthe invasion, and the same sentiment rings true three years later. The Russian military itself\u00a0<br \/>\nbecame a victim of this distorted reality. Corruption was endemic but hidden from official\u00a0<br \/>\nreports. Training exercises were choreographed performances rather than realistic preparations.\u00a0<br \/>\nEquipment maintenance existed on paper while actual hardware deteriorated in storage. This is\u00a0<br \/>\nunderscored by a closer examination of Russia\u2019s military doctrine. As a holdover from Soviet\u00a0<br \/>\ntimes, Russia\u2019s perceived biggest risk was a NATO invasion. To that end, Russia created operations\u00a0<br \/>\nand strategies to defend the motherland rather than invade. Its concentrated command structure\u00a0<br \/>\nwould help it shore up weaknesses in defenses, but it also opened itself up to rampant corruption\u00a0<br \/>\nand power reshuffling once Putin came into power. With Russia losing momentum, there\u2019s a possibility\u00a0<br \/>\nthat Putin himself could be \u201cousted\u201d from the Russian throne. After all, he would be quickly\u00a0<br \/>\nfound solely responsible for the disaster, and power-hungry politicians in the Kremlin\u00a0<br \/>\nwould need to save face by removing him. However, Brookings succinctly analyzed that Russia\u2019s\u00a0<br \/>\ncurrent political structure doesn\u2019t really have a viable candidate to succeed him, and that\u00a0<br \/>\nthe entire regime might not survive a leadership change. This opens up a chance that Russia itself\u00a0<br \/>\ncould collapse. This would happen in a few stages, but they would progress rather quickly\u00a0<br \/>\nor even coincide with one another. First, there\u2019s the economic breakdown. Russia\u2019s war\u00a0<br \/>\neconomy is already showing severe strain, with defense spending crowding out essential\u00a0<br \/>\nservices. As casualties mount and sanctions bite deeper, this becomes unsustainable.\u00a0<br \/>\nCritical infrastructure\u2014already suffering from underinvestment\u2014begins to fail more frequently.\u00a0<br \/>\nSecond, political fragmentation. Regional governors, especially in resource-rich areas like\u00a0<br \/>\nthe Far East, begin asserting greater autonomy from Moscow. Initially presented as an economic\u00a0<br \/>\nnecessity, these moves gradually acquire political dimensions. Third, military disintegration. As\u00a0<br \/>\nthe professional army is ground down in Ukraine, Russia increasingly relies on poorly trained\u00a0<br \/>\nconscripts and ethnic minorities from peripheral regions. Unit cohesion breaks down. Desertion\u00a0<br \/>\nrates skyrocket. Military equipment fails without replacement parts. Finally, the central\u00a0<br \/>\nauthority collapses. Whether through palace coup, popular uprising, or simply the inability\u00a0<br \/>\nto project power to Russia\u2019s vast regions, the Moscow government loses effective control over\u00a0<br \/>\nsignificant portions of Russian territory. The consequences would be catastrophic, and not just\u00a0<br \/>\nfor Russia but for global security. The Federation would likely collapse into a series of states,\u00a0<br \/>\nresembling the breakup of Yugoslavia or the fall of the Soviet Union itself in the 1990s. The core\u00a0<br \/>\nof the country, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, would likely attempt to relocate Russia\u2019s nuclear weapon\u00a0<br \/>\nreserves and proclaim itself the successor state, saber-rattling with the arsenal much like Putin\u00a0<br \/>\ndid during the war. Scores of immigrants would try to enter the EU again, going after the successes\u00a0<br \/>\nseen by former Warsaw Pact members like Romania and Poland. China might swoop in and occupy swaths\u00a0<br \/>\nof resource-rich territory in Siberia for itself to fuel its bottomless industry. So the next time\u00a0<br \/>\nsomeone confidently tells you that \u201cRussia is winning in Ukraine,\u201d you just need to go back\u00a0<br \/>\nto the beginning: After three years of what was supposed to be a war that lasted a few days,\u00a0<br \/>\nRussia controls just 20% of Ukraine, has suffered casualties approaching one million, has devastated\u00a0<br \/>\nits economy, destroyed its international standing, reinvigorated its adversaries, and has no viable\u00a0<br \/>\npath to actual victory. The truth is that Russia isn\u2019t winning\u2014it\u2019s trapped in a strategic disaster\u00a0<br \/>\nentirely of its own making, with no good options and no clear exit. The longer this war continues,\u00a0<br \/>\nthe more catastrophic the consequences will be for Russia itself. But what do you think? Thanks\u00a0<br \/>\nfor watching, and leave your comments below.<br \/>\n<br \/>\nRussia thought Ukraine would fall in 72 hours. Three years later, it\u2019s lost nearly a million troops, crippled its economy, and still holds just 20% of Ukraine.<\/p>\n<p>Support us directly as we bring you independent, up-to-date reporting on military news and global conflicts by clicking here: https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/channel\/UCKfak8fBm_Lhy4eX9UKxEpA\/join<\/p>\n<p>#militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis<br \/>\n#themilitaryshow<\/p>\n<p>SOURCES: https:\/\/pastebin.com\/p7bzjGfa<br \/>\nATTRIBUTIONS: https:\/\/pastebin.com\/9R75Fhpi<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Still Think Russia is Winning? WATCH THIS Before You Speak Again On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded\u00a0 Ukraine<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":1842001,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[593415],"tags":[948239,948240,948241,90861,135,29752,6887,18986,877052,9,30213],"class_list":{"0":"post-1842000","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-2025-summer","8":"tag-2025-summer","9":"tag-2025-summer-anime","10":"tag-948241","11":"tag-air-force","12":"tag-anime","13":"tag-army","14":"tag-military","15":"tag-navy","16":"tag-sand-land-the-series","17":"tag-9","18":"tag-30213"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1842000","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1842000"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1842000\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1842001"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1842000"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1842000"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.wacoca.com\/anime\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1842000"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}